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argues that this reading fails in that for Kant 'civil society must exist
before conclusive right-claims can be established' (p. 11). The right
to private property in the state of nature is provisional and can
become conclusive only- through the establishment of civil society.
In regard to conclusive rights of property possession, 'the state must
allocate property in such a way that a rightful condition of civil
society is achieved and maintained' (p. 12). Kant held, and the logic
\ of his property argument does not preclude him from holding,
that restrictions on private property are warranted for the sake of
maintaining or promoting a rightful civil society, including the
sustenance of the poor.
A second objection is that social welfare legislation cannot be a
proper aim of the Kantian legislator because Kant repeatedly states
that juridical ,legislation should not be gr!Junded in welfare or
happiness. Kaufman replies that Kant only 'rejects a political
principle which assigns to the sovereign the right and responsibility
to determine for its subjects what the basis of their happiness should
be and to secure that basis for the subjects, possibly independent of
or contrary to their autonomous willing' (p. 38). This leaves open
the possibility that the Kantian legislator designs welfare programmes that indirectly promote the happiness or welfare' of its
recipients by aiming directly at increasing, for example, their social
and economic opportunities. Kaufman goes on to show that Kant's
opposition to 'hedonic' legislation is directed at cameralist theorists such as Johann Heinrich Gottlieb von Justi (1717-68), who
argued for a paternalistic welfare state with comprehensive social
regulation (pp. 39ff.). Kant encountered cameralist thought in the
works of Christian Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten.
Here Kaufman covers rather unexplored ground in contemporary
Kant scholarship, showing that what is often loosely described
as Kant's critique of political utilitarianism was in fact a critique of
cameralism (pp. 51ff.).
A final objection is that positive law in Kant is too indeterminate
to commit the legislator to promoting social welfare. In other
words, the metaphysical principles of right are so formal that it
becomes a contingent matter whether the Kantian legislator will
actually seek to aid the poor. Kaufman rejects this objection insofar
as it claims that Kant argued for positive law as largely indeterminate and held that his formal principles must not structure
decisively the content of positive' law. What is correct, however, is
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that 'Kant offers no clear account of the relation between positive
_
and natural law' (p. 141).
Kaufman .argues that reflective (teleological) political judgement
~an solve th~s 'content problem' in Kapt. Chapters 3-5 of Welfare
~n the Kan:zan State focu~ on the nature of reflective (political)
Judgement m general, while the sixth and final chapter seeks to
?round Kant's social welfare proposals by way of reflective political
Judgements. The final chapter also offers an elaboration of Kant's
welfare proposa~s, lea~in~ to a 'Kantian social welfare theory.'
The metaphysICal prmClples of right stipulate that civil society be
for~ed. as a precondition for rightful property possession and the
reahzatlO~ ?f equal liberty. Kaufman argues that reflective judgement exhIbIts further substantive implications of these principles
throu?~ variou~ ~nalogies, such as the state as self-organized being
and cItIzens as Jomt authors of the united will. He writes:

overhaul of welfare programmes in the United States under
Clinton's presidency is not mentioned. A further explor~tion of
how the Aristotelian-based capabilities approach accords wIth (and
differs from) Kant's understanding of autonomous individual development and its preconditions would have been welco.me. S.O ~oul~ a
detailed discussion of the implications of the Kantian dIstnbutive
principle for existing economic institutions and international aid.
Still Kaufman offers an important and very closely argued contrib~tion to Kant scholarship and any future work on Kant's understanding of social welfare must build on his study.

These analogies jointly define a rightful condition as a state in which all

Clemens Schwaiger, Kategorische und andere Imperative: Zur Entwicklung
von Kants praktischer Philosophie bis 1785. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt:
Frommann-Holzboog, 1999. Pp. 252. ISBN 3-7728-1971-0. DM 88.00.

mem?~rs are assured equal access to the opportunity to realize an uncondlt~on~d f~rm of purposiveness (humanity), and thus the capacity to
define mstltutlOns and rules constitutive of an ideal civil society. (p. 147)

HARRY VAN .DER LINDEN
Butler University, Indianapolis

This very learned book may be viewed as the attempt to accomplish
two different things. First, it is an attempt to trace the development
of Kant's doctrine of the categorical imperative and its connections
with imperatives of skill and prudence (which are usually l~mpe.d
together under the title 'hypothetical imperatives'). SchwaI~er IS
convinced that the 'long and tortuous path' that led Kant to dIfferentiate between these different types of imperatives is important for the philosophical discussion of categorical imperatives in
Kant. He views himself as 'providing the building blocks' for a
commentary on that part of the Groundwork which first introduces
the categorical imperative. Secondly, and more importantly - even
if the author himself downplays this aspect of his work - it is a
. thoroughgoing revision of the history of the development of Kant's
ethical theory.
One may doubt whether the distinction between impera~ives
of skill, prudence and morality (or 'wisdom', as Kant s.ometimes
also called the latter) is as important to our understandmg of the
categorical imperative as Schwaiger believes he has shown. ~ne
might even argue that it stands in the way of a proper understan~mg
of the categorical imperative. Kant uses the plural of categoncal
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